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INTRODUCTION
The American justice system is vast, complex, varied and dy-
namic. We are a large country and legal problems are ubiquitous. Each
year, about half of all households experience at least one problem for
which the advice of a lawyer is sought or desired.' So, at least
50,000,000 times each year, American families look down a road that
could lead them to the American justice system.
Many turn away from that path, abandoning potential legal
claims without much consideration. Some who turn away do not think
the journey will lead them where they want to go. Others think the trip
too arduous.2 Then there is a group that begins to pursue their rights.
Some of those folks turn back or get lost; others persevere with the
help of a lawyer while another subset of those seeking legal redress
* Professor of Law, Fordham Law School. Thanks to David Udell, Director of the
National Center for Access to Justice, Dean Matthew Diller, whose Access to Justice
Initiative inspired this project, and Professor Sam Estreicher.
1. See Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice: An Agenda for Legal Education and
Research, 62 J. LEGAL EDUC. 531 (2013) (discussing the magnitude of legal needs);
Rebecca L. Sandefur, The Impact of Counsel: An Analysis of Empirical Evidence, 9
SEATTLE J. FOR Soc. JUST. 51 (2010) (analyzing data on legal need and legal
services).
2. See Catherine R. Albiston & Rebecca L. Sandefur, Expanding the Empirical
Study of Access to Justice, 2013 Wis. L. REV. 101, 101 (2013) (reviewing data on
barriers to access to justice); Herbert Kritzer, Examining the Real Demand for Legal
Services, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 255 (2010) (presenting and discussing descriptive
data on the choice to seek counsel for a legal need).
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find their way to the courthouse without a lawyer. Those unrepre-
sented litigants must rely upon themselves and what guidance they can
get from the courts. Too many people face too many barriers when
they need access to justice in America. 3
In recent years, there has been renewed attention to the problem
of access to justice for low- and moderate-income Americans. Efforts
by federal,4 state,5 and private actors6 have blossomed. While there
are many important discussions about the many ways the law could be
improved and more resources devoted to the justice system, other im-
portant work focuses more on the experience of seeking justice in
American courts and looks to the courts' powers to reform their own
practices, procedures, and local rules. Important as legal reform-
3. See Ian Weinstein, Access to Civil Justice in America: What Do We Know?, in
BEYOND ELITE LAW: ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE FOR AMERICANS OF AVERAGE MEANS
3, 4 (Samuel Estreicher & Joy Radice eds., 2016) [hereinafter BEYOND ELITE LAW]
(discussing supply and demand for legal services and concluding that there is a signif-
icant gap in access to justice for individuals and families of low- and moderate-
income).
4. In 2010, the United States Department of Justice created the Access to Justice
Initiative "to address the access-to-justice crisis in the criminal and civil justice sys-
tem." Access to Justice, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/atj (last vis-
ited Apr. 1, 2017).
5. More than thirty states have established Access to Justice Commissions or other
groups focused on facilitating access to civil justice. Access to Justice Commissions,
AM. BAR Ass'N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal-aid-indigentdefendants/
initiatives/resource center for accessto justice/atj -commissions.html (last visited
Apr. 1, 2017). For a discussion on access to justice issues across the nation, see Ac-
cess to Justice for Low-Income People: Recent Developments August 2011-January
2012, AM. BAR Ass'N, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abaladministrative/
legal-aid-indigent defendants/1s-sclaid-atj-ccjyreportjan2012.authcheckdam.pdf
(last visited Apr. 1, 2017). One of the most active state groups in recent years has
been the New York Task Force. See Permanent Commission on Access to Justice,
N.Y. ST. UNIFIED COURT Sys., http://www.nycourts.gov/accesstojusticecommission/
index.shtml (last visited Apr. 1, 2017); see generally Helaine M. Barnett, New York
State Task Force to Expand Access to Civil Legal Services, in BEYOND ELITE LAW,
supra note 3, at 343; Victoria A. Graffeo, New York's 50-Hour Pro Bono Require-
ment, in BEYOND ELITE LAW, supra note 3, at 359.
6. See, e.g., PETER L. MARKOWITZ ET AL., STUDY GRP. ON IMMIGRANT REPRESEN-
TATION, ACCESSING JUSTICE: TIE AVAILABILITY AND ADEQUACY OF COUNSEL IN IM-
MIGRATION PROCEEDINGS (2011), http://www.cardozolawreview.com/content/denovo/
NYIRSReport.pdf; NABANITA PAL, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, FACING FORECLO-
SURE ALONE: THE CONTINUING CRISIS IN LEGAL REPRESENTATION (2011), http://www
.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/FacingForeclosureAlone.pdf; see also
JOY MOSES, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, GROUNDS FOR OBJECTION: CAUSES AND CONSE-
QUENCES OF AMERICA'S PRO SE CRISIS AND How TO SOLVE THE PROB3LEM OF UNREP-
RESENTED LITIGANTS (2011), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/
issues/2011/06/pdf/objection.pdf (reporting on the pro se crisis); Resource Center for
Access to Justice Initiatives, AM. BAR Ass'N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/le-
gal-aid-indigent-defendants/initiatives/resource center foraccesstojustice.html
(last visited Apr. 1, 2017).
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changes in statutes, regulations, and case law-is to the access to jus-
tice movement, the problem also presents rich opportunities to reap
the benefits that flow when actors in complex social systems have
better access to information about lower level, less visible decisions.
Statutes and cases are generally more visible than local rules, policies,
and practices, which are much harder to see, learn about, assess, or
adopt. Yet many of the barriers to access to justice are matters of
administration and management of this sort.
Game theory offers a useful model to understand the power of
improving communication about norms and expectations among ac-
tors who must work together in certain kinds of complicated systems.
The agglomeration of courts and agencies that make up the justice
system is being improved by information sharing designed to help
judges, court staff, litigants, politicians, and others row in the same
direction. Everyone agrees that there should be fewer and lower barri-
ers to access to justice in America. How can the disparate actors in
that complex system best coordinate to achieve shared goals, particu-
larly given the absence of unified controlling structures or efficient
channels of direct communication among all those players?
This paper proceeds in three steps. First, it describes the vast,
complex, varied, and dynamic landscape of the American justice sys-
tem and argues that the promise of top-down change is limited by the
design of our justice system. While the scope of the system is a con-
tingent but still significant factor that makes high-level change hard,
complexity, variation and dynamism are all intentional qualities,
deeply embedded in the system by its designers. Federalism and the
reflexive distrust of centralization from which that idea springs, make
our justice system resistant to universal reform by high-level changes
in law, whether they might flow from congressional, executive, or Su-
preme Court action.7
Second, the paper applies a simplified game theory model to the
problem of access of justice. Drawing on a few ideas from Thomas
Schelling's classic book, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT,8 if the justice
7. High-level change requires political will, political power, and a mechanism.
While mechanisms for high-level reform are limited by structural features flowing
from the horizontal and vertical divisions of our governing bodies, the more pressing
current concern is about the lack of political will to continue federal efforts to improve
access to justice. While this paper describes a general phenomenon, the current politi-
cal climate foregrounds the importance of coordination efforts. Information sharing
and certain kinds of technical benchmarking remain, for now, reasonably non-
partisan.
8. THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFicr (1980) (exploring the ex-
tension of game theory from zero sum to non-zero sum games, the role of explicit and
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system can be modeled as a multi-player system with limited informa-
tion flow in which actors look for and respond to signals about desira-
ble norms and practices, the significance of focal points, or widely
shared assumptions about paradigm cases, comes to the foreground.
With that understanding, this paper closes with discussion, and
some comparison, of access to justice initiatives. Looking at two dif-
ferent benchmarking efforts, this paper highlights how work to share
information, create widely shared baselines, and educate the broad
range of actors in this vast, complex, varied, and dynamic system is
particularly well-suited to addressing the American justice gap.
I.
A BIG AND HARD PROBLEM
The problem of access to justice for low- and moderate-income
people is vast in scope. Looking at the demand side, tens of millions
of legal problems arise each year in low- and moderate-income house-
holds. While the wealthy have ready access to lawyers, courts, and
alternative dispute resolution fora, those of lesser means9 face chal-
lenges. Families with moderate incomes seek legal advice or go to
court to resolve about half of their legal problems. The problem is
worse for low-income households. They access lawyers or courts for
only about twenty percent of their problems, yet they face more legal
implicit information in developing and executing strategies in games with multiple
equilibria, and introducing the idea of focal points or shared norms and ideas in struc-
turing games in which players do not communicate directly). Dr. Schelling won the
Nobel Prize in Economics in 2005 and died in December 2016. See William Grimes,
Thomas C. Schelling, Master Theorist of Nuclear Strategy, Dies at 95, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 14, 2016, at B14.
9. The federal test for eligibility for representation by a Legal Services Corpora-
tion- (LSC) funded program, a reasonable surrogate for a low-income household, is
whether one has an income at or below 125% of the federal poverty level. In 2009,
56.8 million Americans lived in eligible households. Additionally, more than 55 mil-
lion Americans who were over sixty years of age in 2009 also qualified for some
LSC-funded programs. See REBECCA L. SANDEFUR & AARON C. SMYTH, AM. BAR.
FOUND., ACCESS ACROSS AMERICA: FIRST REPORT OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE INFRASTRUC-
TURE MAPPING PROJECT (2011), http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/
documents/access-across-america first.reportof the-civil-justice infrastructure
mapping-project.pdf. There is no single definition of moderate-income households in
the access to justice literature. There were 122,459,000 households in America in
2012, and their median income was $51,017. Sixty percent of households had incomes
of $64,582 or less. Eighty percent of households had incomes below $104,096, and
only five percent of households had incomes of $191,157 or greater. CARMEN
DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH IN-
SURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2012, at 9 (2013), https://www.census
.gov/prod/2013pubs/p60-245.pdf.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Legislation and Public Policy
504 [Vol. 20:501
ACCESS TO JUSTICE
problems than those of moderate means.10 Millions more low- and
moderate-income Americans would use the legal system each year if
they had better access to lawyers and if courts and other formal
processes were more accessible to people without legal training."
The differences in access among different classes of people and
the large unmet need among moderate- and low-income people is a
large problem in at least two ways: it affects a lot of people and it
compromises a very important and fundamental shared value. The
American justice gap is both quite material-many people are af-
fected-and ideal-our norm of equal treatment under law is deeply
challenged. While it is crucial for us to better understand what Ameri-
cans need from the legal system today, and how we can better meet
those needs, the overall picture is clear: there is a big gap in justice
among different classes of people, and there is a big gap between our
aspirations for access to justice in America and our current ability to
give all Americans access to the law. It is a gap that swallows tens of
millions of people each year. While that is a problem of daunting
scope, it is not the only challenge this landscape presents.
The justice gap is not only very large, it also presents a lot of
challenging terrain that makes the path to justice difficult. At the start,
there is the complexity and obscurity of the law. The system devel-
oped with the assumption that most people would have a lawyer to
guide them. This feature of the terrain is daunting enough and it poses
a maze through which the uninitiated may wander forever. However,
thinking of a single maze or a tangle of thickets does not begin to
capture the complexity of the problem. To non-lawyers, and even to
lawyers who stray too far from their expertise, the law presents many
thickets; easily confused with each other. At base, this is an issue of
matching the problem, that an individual faces with the substantive
and procedural legal resources through which it might be solved.
Consider the situation of a family whose home is damaged in a
natural disaster. Perhaps they categorize this challenge as only a natu-
ral disaster and rebuild on their own. Or maybe they learn of disaster
assistance but are denied because they cannot prove ownership of a
10. Weinstein, supra note 3, at 6 n.22-33 (citing AM. BAR Ass'N, LEGAL NEEDS
AND CivIL JUSTICE: A SURVEY OF AMERICANS (1994) (reviewing data from the last
comprehensive national study and from more recent state and LSC studies showing
differences between moderate- and low-income households in the types, frequency of,
and responses to legal problems)).
11. Rhode, supra note 1, at 533-35 (discussing sources and data for analysis of
legal needs or demand side for legal services); Sandefur, supra note 1, at 56-60 (same
and concluding that legal problems are very common but responses within the legal
system are not).
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home that has been in the family for many years. Some in this situa-
tion will not conceive of or choose to seek legal redress. Perhaps they
do not know the decision is subject to legal review or perhaps they are
skeptical that they will get satisfaction. 12 The subgroup that recog-
nizes their problem as having a legal aspect and are motivated to use
the law face challenges in access at this stage. Do they seek the advice
of a probate, insurance, or property law specialist? Is the problem best
seen as a federal administrative law issue, addressing the regulations
that control the benefits, or do they need to quiet title in state court and
then reengage with the benefit program? The decision path is chal-
lenging for many lawyers, let alone those who cannot access legal
advice.
Beyond the complexity of the law, those who fall into the justice
gap must also contend with the procedural complexities of the Ameri-
can legal system. Most lawyers are habituated to the intricate court
systems we have devised out of our American dedication to divided
power and multiple levels of government. But it is not intuitive to
most people to have federal, state, and local courts, as well as adminis-
trative tribunals, at each level of government. Each of those courts has
its own structure, leadership, and procedures.
One need not even seek a detailed map of the court system before
encountering bewildering complexity. Of course, there are some areas
that are clear and easy to grasp. There are currently 860 federal judges
permanently appointed under Article m of the Constitution. There are
663 district court judges, 167 judges on the courts of appeal, 12 Fed-
eral Circuit Judges, 4 Territorial Judges, 9 judges on the Court of In-
ternational Trade, 16 Court of Federal Claims Judges, and 9 Justices
of the United States Supreme Court.1 3 Our Article III federal courts
are clearly and uniformly structured. They sit in a simple, well-defined
judicial' 4 and administrative hierarchy.15 But even in this carefully
tended land, the view is sometimes obscured.
12. See generally Sara Sternberg Greene, Race, Class, and Access to Civil Justice,
101 IoWA L. REV. 1263 (2016) (reporting results of a study suggesting that poor
people and people of color avoid the civil justice in disproportionate numbers because
of negative perceptions of its legitimacy).
13. Authorized Judgeships-From 1789 to Present, U.S. COURTS, http://www.us-
courts.gov/sites/default/files/allauth.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2017).
14. There are also 10 judges in temporary district court judgeships, meaning there
are actually 673 total district court judges sitting in 663 permanent and 10 temporary
judgeships. U.S. District Courts: Authorized Temporary Judgeships, U.S. COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/district-temporary-judgeships_0.pdf (last
visited Apr. 1, 2017). The temporary judgeships are long-term and the judges enjoy all
Article III protections. Id.
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While the number of authorized judgeships is clear, the number
of sitting federal judges is harder to determine. A significant number
of judges continue to hear cases as senior judges. 16 Senior federal
judges make a considerable, but somewhat hidden contribution to the
work of the federal courts. Even where structure is clearest and data
collection quite strong, it is hard to get a clear picture of the workings
of the justice system.
Once we turn our gaze to the state courts, where almost all cases
are heard, we see great complexity, variation, and dynamism. The ba-
sic task of counting state courts and their caseloads is confounded at
the highest level by the existence of two different kinds of courts.
Forty-three states have dual tier court systems combining courts of
limited jurisdiction and courts of general jurisdiction.' 7 In the dual tier
states, some cases start in a court of limited jurisdiction and are then
refiled in a court of general jurisdiction while other cases stay in the
limited jurisdiction courts and yet other cases are initiated in the courts
of general jurisdiction. A significant number of cases are filed, and
counted, twice.
Seven states, including California, have a single-tier system. In
these states, cases are not routinely sent up or down between inferior
and superior courts. Beyond the complexities of actually navigating
these disparate systems, the variation in structures makes the seem-
ingly simple project of counting and comparing caseloads quite
challenging.
The National Center on State Courts (NCSC) reports that there
were 94.1 million incoming cases in the state courts in 2013.18 Fifty-
one point one million were traffic matters. Of those traffic matters, 9.3
million were filed in single-tier states. The remaining 41.8 million
were filed in two-tier systems, with the vast bulk of the cases, 38.9
million traffic cases, filed in courts of limited (often singular) jurisdic-
15. See generally Judicial Administration, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/
about-federal-courts/judicial-administration (last visited Apr. 1, 2017).
16. For example, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York has twenty-eight authorized judgeships. See Chronological History of Author-
ized Judgeships-District Courts, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-
judgeships/authorized-judgeships/chronological-history-authorized-judgeships-dis-
trict-courts. The website lists forty-four judges and does not distinguish between se-
nior and active judges. See generally Frederic Block, Senior Status: An "Active"
Senior Judge Corrects Some Common Misunderstandings, 92 CORNELL L. REv. 533
(2007).
17. NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN
OVERVIEW OF 2013 STATE COURT CASELOADs 7 (2015), http://www.courtstatistics.
org/-/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/EWSCCSP_2015.ashx.
18. Id. at 7.
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tion. Of the remaining 2.9 million traffic cases filed in courts of gen-
eral jurisdiction, some were also filed in lower courts. So, we know
there are 51.1 million traffic cases, but they are handled in two differ-
ent types of courts and there is much variation even among the fami-
lies of courts. 19
Similarly, there were 19.5 million incoming criminal cases in the
state courts in 2013, exclusive of criminal traffic matters. Of those, 2.4
million were in the single-tier states. Of the remaining 17.1 million,
13.6 million were in courts of limited jurisdiction and 3.5 million were
in courts of general jurisdiction. 20 Here too, the most common form of
the dual tier system has all cases starting in a lower criminal court and
felony cases being transferred, upon indictment, to the trial court of
general jurisdiction. But, once again, there is fair variation, and many
misdemeanors are heard in higher courts across the country, some-
times as a matter of practice, and sometimes when they are resolved
along with more serious charges. 2 1
The three other categories of cases, the 16.9 million civil cases,
the 5.2 million domestic relations cases and the 1.4 million juvenile
cases, are similarly parsed in the study. Each area reflects its own
structure and history, even in the most basic descriptive statistics
about caseloads. The gross count of the cases offers one perspective
on the vastness of the American justice system. Scratching the surface
reveals complexity and variation. We can say a bit about the largest
trends, but the data is limited and subject to many qualifications.
The system is also dynamic. The report notes a decline in case
filings across all types of cases in recent years. Overall filings rose
from 2004 to 2008. The 2013 data shows a decline of six percent from
the 2004 total of 100 million cases, the earliest data reported in the
study, and eleven percent from the highest number of cases filed, the
2008 total of 106 million. Case filings are down thirteen percent since
2004, as measured by filings per 100,000 people. Indeed, as the na-
tional population has increased, case filings have declined in absolute
numbers as well as relative to population. 22
This overall decline in case filings reflects a few probable trends,
but is not well-understood. The significant decline in filings in crimi-
nal cases fits with the long-term decline in crime and the decrease in
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 8.
22. Id. at 2-3.
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criminal cases, particularly misdemeanor cases, in some large cities. 23
The decline in juvenile cases appears quite large and reflects declines
across all case types. 2 4 The decline in civil cases, which seem to have
peaked around, or soon after, the economic downturn in 2008 may be
related to the surge in foreclosures and consumer debt actions that
grew out of the financial crisis. But the roles of mandatory arbitration
clauses, 25 and shifts in public perceptions of the courts 26 may also be
factors.
As one studies the civil docket in American courts, the maps be-
come more obscure and less reliable. Yet this is the most popular part
of the landscape for most Americans; the place they would go to re-
solve contract, property, tort, discrimination, and small claims cases.
In 2013, there were about 17 million civil cases filed, excluding do-
mestic relations cases. Analyzing the national picture, the 2013 report
of the NCSC, THE LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION, notes that
"[d]ifferences among states ... make it extremely difficult to provide
national estimates of civil caseloads with sufficient granularity to an-
swer the most pressing questions of state court policymakers." 27 That
report studied 152 courts in ten urban counties selected to capture the
variety of organizational structures across state courts. The sample
consisted of more than 925,000 cases or about five percent of the state
civil caseloads.
This report was the first large-scale study of civil cases since the
1992 Civil Justice Survey. 2 8 The report notes the significant increase
in contract cases over the past twenty-five years and the modest
amounts of money at stake in many of those cases. 29 Most of those are
consumer debt cases in which banks or other lenders, or their succes-
sors in interest, seek judgments against individuals.
23. See OLIVER ROEDER, ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, WHAT CAUSED THE
CRIME DECLINE (2015) (analyzing research on the causes of declining crime rates);
FRANK ZIMRING, THE CITY THAT BECAME SAFE (2011) (analyzing data on crime in
New York City and arguing that the data reflects a real increase in public safety).
24. See generally JULIE FURDELLA & CHARLES PUZZANCHERA, DELINQUENCY
CASES IN JUVENILE COURT (2013), https://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/248899.pdf.
25. See generally Paul F. Kirgis et al., "Whimsy Little Contracts" with Unexpected
Consequences: An Empirical Analysis of Arbitration Agreements, 75 Mo. L. REV. 1
(2015) (discussing the rise and prevalence of arbitration agreements as background to
empirical work suggesting consumers typically misunderstand arbitration clauses).
26. See Greene, supra note 12.
27. PAULA HANNAFORD-AGOR ET AL., NAT'L CTR. ON STATE COURTS, THE LAND-
SCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS iii (2015), http://www.ncsc.org/-/me-
dia/Files/PDF/Research/CivilJusticeReport-2015.ashx.
28. Id. at 14.
29. Id. at 35.
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The rise in consumer debt cases has been accompanied by a steep
rise in pro se litigants. The NCSC report notes that the 1992 study
found very low rates of unrepresented parties in civil litigation in
America. In courts of general jurisdiction, where the higher value and
higher stakes cases are heard, about five percent of the parties were
unrepresented in the 1992 study. The 2013 data shows that plaintiffs
continue to be represented in more than ninety percent of the cases,
while defendants were only represented in twenty-six percent of the
civil cases heard in courts of general jurisdiction.
In small claims courts, on the other hand, the report found "a
higher than expected proportion"3 0 of cases in which the plaintiff was
represented by counsel. While both sides were represented in only
thirteen percent of the small claims cases, as is consistent with the
design of those courts as informal tribunals to resolve minor disputes,
more than seventy-five percent of plaintiffs were represented by
counsel.
The report notes that to the degree the public, or the legal profes-
sion, thinks of the core of civil litigation as high stakes tort, contract,
and property litigation between parties represented by counsel, that is
a serious misunderstanding. While there is tremendous variation from
county to county and court to court, most civil litigation involves low
stakes contract cases3 ' in which at least one party is pro se. 3 2
American civil litigation has changed in the last twenty-five years
from a system in which both parties either had or did not have a law-
yer to a system in which civil plaintiffs usually have lawyers and civil
defendants usually do not. While overall rates of self-representation
have risen in this group of cases, the rise in unrepresented defendants
facing a represented plaintiff in a civil action emerges as among the
most distinctive 33 and concerning trend.34 The expansion of consumer
30. Id. at 33.
31. Id. at 17.
32. Id. at 32.
33. Of course some courts have long had high rates of pro se litigants. Landlord
tenant courts in many large cities have long had many cases in which unrepresented
tenants faced landlords represented by counsel.
34. Pro se defendants are less likely to resolve their cases at an earlier stage with
summary judgment or other pretrial motions and represented parties get better out-
comes. See HANNAFORD-AGOR ET AL., supra note 27, at 33; Sandefur, supra note 1, at
69 (marshalling evidence that represented parties prevail at higher rates than pro se
litigants); see also JOHN M. GREACEN, SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS AND COURT
AND LEGAL SERVICES RESPONSES TO THEIR NEEDS: WHAT WE KNOW 8-12 (2003),
http://lri.archive.1sc.gov/sites/Isc.gov/files/LRI/pdf/02/020045-selfreplitigants what
weknow.pdf.
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credit, the growth of debt buying,3 5 the greater openness of courts to
pro se litigants, the rise in the cost of legal services, and the reinvigo-
ration of the American culture of self-help are all likely causal factors,
but this important phenomenon is not well-understood.
The American justice system is vast, complex, varied, and dy-
namic. The scope and dynamism reflect the size and vitality of our
nation. The complexity reflected in federalism and specialization re-
flects our ambitions and sophistication. The variations across the sys-
tem are not just a result of these forces-they are the most basic
expression of the Anglo-American commitment to dispersing power in
overlapping institutions and valuing local independence as a counter-
weight to the centralizing tendency of legal hierarchies. As the great
comparativist Mirjan Damaska noted, the common law is fundamen-
tally committed to complexity and variation as important means, in
and of themselves, to achieve fairness in individual cases and resist
tyranny.36
The vastness, complexity, variation, and dynamism of our courts
reflect basic social facts like population and economic trends as well
as structural features reflecting deep normative commitments to dis-
persed power, local control, and broad access to courts. Complexity
and variation are not accidental or transient features of our justice sys-
tem. Of course, that does not mean we must celebrate complexity and
variation for their own sake. Those characteristics pose great chal-
lenges to the movement to improve access to justice in America.
Foregrounding their deep roots of this complexity and variation helps
bring the nature of the difficulties into sharper focus and points toward
helpful interventions.
It is hard to change a very large, complex, varied, and dynamic
system. Fortunately, many actors in the justice system share the goals
of improving access to justice. But getting all of them, or even many
of them, to agree on a shared vision of what improved access would
look like is a difficult endeavor. Moving from that broad agreement to
35. See generally FED. TRADE COMM'N, THE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES OF THE
DEBT BUYING INDUSTRY (2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
reports/structure-and-practices-debt-buying-industry/debtbuyingreport.pdf; RACHEL
TERP & LAUREN BOWNE, PAST DUE: WHY DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES AND THE
DEBT BUYING INDUSTRY NEED REFORM Now (2011), https://consumersunion.org/pdf/
PastDueReport201 1.pdf.
36. Mirjan Damaska, Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Proce-
dure, 84 YALE L.J. 480, 509 (1975) (arguing that competing views of the structure of
authority are the fount of the continental emphasis on hierarchy, uniformity, and for-
mal proof as compared to the Anglo-American toleration for dispersed and competing
power, variation in result, and the performative emphasis of adjudication by time lim-
ited trial).
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efficacious reform presents other challenges. There are a few levers
attached to all parts of the system, but the reach of general, top-down
solutions is quite limited.
The United States Supreme Court sits atop the entire, sprawling
justice system and its decisions can have important effects throughout
the whole system. Cases such as Goldberg v Kelly 37 and Turner v
Rogers 38 can reframe, or decline to reframe, the legal context for the
kinds of civil litigation most often encountered by low- and moderate-
income Americans. But the Court hears about seventy cases a year,
and the impact of its decisions turns out to be very hard to predict over
time. To analogize from the criminal context, Gideon v Wainwright39
was a milestone in strengthening the Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel in criminal cases but it surely did not solve the problem.40
Congress, subject to the complex doctrines of federalism, has the
power to make national laws and fund local programs. There are sig-
nificant political and fiscal constraints on the use of those powers to
address access to justice issues in the state courts.
Both the Supreme Court and Congress have the capacity to com-
municate directly with the entire justice system. The Supreme Court,
when it addresses the meaning of the United States Constitution,
speaks directly to all judges and other legal actors. When Congress
passes national laws, in particular, national laws disbursing federal
funds to legal institutions and setting conditions for those expendi-
tures, it speaks directly to the whole system. The volume and efficacy
of those communications is significantly constrained by law and polit-
ics, but information flows from those national institutions to all parts
of the system and the two bodies exercise direct authority over the
whole system.
Direct lines of communication and authority also characterize the
relationships between state governments and their state courts and
within the hierarchy of each state court system. Here again, state high
courts are limited by the uncertain reach of new court rulings and state
legislatures face fiscal and political constraints on efforts to reform or
improve courts. But statutory reform, advancing case law, budgeting,
37. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding that due process requires fun-
damental fairness in a hearing to terminate government benefits).
38. Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431 (2011) (requiring safeguards in civil contempt
proceedings but failing to find a right to counsel in those proceedings).
39. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (incorporating the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel in criminal cases into the Fourteenth Amendment and requiring
the states to provide counsel to indigent defendants in criminal cases).
40. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Lessons from Gideon, 122 YALE L.J. 2676
(2013); GIDEON at 50, http://gideonat50.org/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2017).
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and policy are ways that information can flow from state level leaders
to other actors in the courts, subject to political and financial con-
straints, which can often be considerable.
Information does not flow so easily between state systems or hor-
izontally among the many dispersed actors in a given state system. A
judge may get legal guidance from the appellate court under which she
sits but there are not usually direct channels by which a judge can get
guidance about new procedures or practices being used in other courts,
particularly those in other jurisdictions. Similarly, court personnel,
who play such a key role in the experience citizens have when they
seek justice in the courts, do not enjoy the benefits of judicial review
and often have limited access to information about what is going on in
other courtrooms, other courthouses, and other court systems. Our jus-
tice system is organized to foster compartmentalization. 4 1
Yet, across all the components of this vast, complex, varied, and
dynamic system, most of the judges, clerks, litigants, and others share
some basic desire for justice. They would not usually discuss it, occu-
pied as they are with the daily business and often jockeying to get
things done and move along. But they are all working for justice,
sometimes in collaboration, and sometimes in conflict. If they could
be a little more coordinated, the system would work better. Can we
help them get more on the same page?
II.
CHANGING VAST, COMPLEX, VARIED,
AND DYNAMIC SYSTEMS
Economists and game theorists, notably Thomas Schelling 42 and
Robert Myerson, 43 have modeled and analyzed complex, dynamic sys-
tems in which multiple actors try to communicate about and coordi-
nate their activities without direct communication. These works
highlight the role of norms, social understandings, and culture, all of
which give rise to shared, tacit understandings which Schelling cate-
41. The lack of horizontal communication among the states systems and the limits
on vertical communication within each jurisdiction persist, despite the leaps in infor-
mation sharing technologies and practices of the last two decades. Transparency is
greater in many dimensions as courts' websites and other channels have flourished but
the volume and fragmentation of contemporary information flows in among the actors
in the vast civil justice system make organizing principles and structural issues as, if
not more, crucial today than they were twenty years ago.
42. See supra note 8.
43. Roger B. Myerson, Learning from Schelling's Strategy of Conflict, 47 J. EcON.
LITERATURE 1109 (2009) (discussing how Schelling's focal point analysis illuminates
questions of design and reform of political and social institutions).
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gorized as focal points,44 and which have also come to be known as
Schelling points. Although the analogy is not on all fours, 45 there is
something to learn from viewing judges, court personnel, litigants,
politicians, and other stakeholders in their roles as participants in a
single very large, very complicated social institution. Schelling's
framework accords with the general observation that all the partici-
pants in the justice system are engaged in a common and interrelated
enterprise. Most of the actors share the desire to increase access to
justice, at a high level of abstraction at least, and the nature of the
work requires them to coordinate their activities to some degree. But
communication across many different kinds of units and roles in this
big system is quite limited. In game theoretic terms, access to justice
is, in part, a coordination game in which direct communication among
players is limited.
Judges, court staff, litigants, and others are constrained by legal,
budgetary, and social realities, as they strive to achieve justice. Those
constraints impose the rules of the game. As with many challenging
games, multiple strategies or approaches or frameworks can be ap-
plied. The game is much more like chess than tic-tac-toe, as it presents
great complexity of play and a multiplicity of strategies.
The actors in this system choose among alternative paths that bal-
ance those constraints in different ways. Each available path-perhaps
one spends more resources on providing counsel in more cases while
another directs those resources to improving access for unrepresented
litigants-is one of the available combinations of resources, proce-
dures, and so on. Each one of those paths is one of the multiple equi-
libria available in that system.
In other words, all the actors in the justice system share the goal
of giving all Americans access to justice within the law and with the
resources available. They operate in a single large system that has
many smaller operating units and act in ways that reflect their under-
standing of the equilibria of the unit or units in which they participate.
Viewing the problem in this light, a key issue is how change occurs in
systems such as these.
44. See generally SCHELLING, supra note 8. The notion of coordination problems
grew out of the game theoretic debate that developed around questions of modeling
conflict, particularly international conflict in the early Cold War. See generally WIL-
LIAM POUNDSTONE, PRISONER'S DILEMMA (1992).
45. SCHELLING, supra note 8. Actors in the justice system may not understand
themselves as participants in the larger national game, which could cause many to
ignore focal points outside their particular court or jurisdiction. This paper does not
explore whether this is a pure coordination situation or a mixed-motive situation. The
analogy is by no means perfect, but it still has force.
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Game theorists before Schelling recognized that in some systems,
there is an equilibria or strategy that minimizes downside risk for all
players.4 6 The prisoners' dilemma is the best-known example. In that
dilemma, two prisoners are in custody. Each could inform on the other
or remain silent. If only one informs on the other, the single informant
gets released and the other prisoner gets ten years. If both inform, they
both get seven years. If both stay silent, each gets a three-year sen-
tence. If one prisoner could be sure he or she could inform on the
other without consequences, informing would benefit the informer to
the detriment of the other. But given that the two prisoners cannot
communicate or learn of the other's conduct before acting, both are
best served by keeping their mouths shut and accepting moderate pun-
ishment. That game has a single equilibrium that minimizes harm to
all and gives maximum gains to none: the mini-max outcome.
Schelling extended the game theoretic constructs to situations
presenting multiple equilibria, as well as complicated his analysis by
noting three categories of incentive structures: pure conflict, mixed
motives, and pure coordination.4 7 Building on the insights of the Cold
War game theorists, economists, and computer scientists, Schelling
foregrounded the roles of tacit understanding, indirect communication,
competition, cooperation, threat, and the psychology of bargaining in
the real world of conflict.
How do multiple actors or players coordinate their moves if they
cannot or will not talk to each other? Schelling theorized that focal
points-choices that seem natural or intuitive-are key to coordinat-
ing many multi-actor interactions in the absence of direct communica-
tion. The standard example of a focal point imagines the problem of
meeting someone at a specified time in New York City without having
agreed on a place. Assume that each of the two people accepts that he
46. John Nash developed the idea of non-cooperative equilibrium point for multi-
layer games. Also known as a "mini-max" solution or a "Nash equilibrium," these are
strategies that do not lead to victory but rather minimize the player's loss and the
adversary's advantage. See David Crump, Game Theory, Legislation, and the Multiple
Meanings of Equality, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 331, 363-64 (2001). In tic-tac-toe, a
player who gives up the opportunity to win can be assured of not losing. Another
example is the idea that the best way to split a piece of cake is to have one person cut
the cake and the other person choose between the two slices. Schelling notably ex-
tended game theory from the formal assumption of a single mini-max points to the
many complex systems that offer not just one Nash equilibrium, but a number of
equilibria. Although some economists decry the lack of determinism, Myerson argues
that this is the space for culture and contingencies to affect the choice among multiple
equilibria. Myerson, supra note 8, at 5.
47. See generally SCHELLING, supra note 8, at 81-118 (discussing the reorientation
of game theory to account for interdependent decision making in situations involving
multiple equilibria).
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or she must travel somewhere in New York City and cannot simply
wait for the other to come to him or her; both accept the wisdom of a
mini-max or equilibrium.
Under these conditions, many would say that the Schelling point
or focal point for the meeting is the information booth in the main hall
of Grand Central Terminal-that is, for many, the intuitive place for
two people to meet in New York City. Of course, Times Square also
comes to mind, as might Union Square, particularly if the two people
were lifelong trade unionists or knew that each harbored deep nostal-
gia for Klein's Department Store. The point is that the solution reflects
a shared understanding of how to choose among the many equilibria
and that shared understanding does not reflect a winning or even opti-
mal strategy, as measured by most notions of efficiency or utility. Af-
ter all, there are multiple reasonable places to meet and the solution
does not minimize travel time or costs. Rather, it reflects the unspoken
but shared understanding of what is natural or expected among the
multiple actors. 4 8
Imagine a judge who encounters a consumer credit (contract)
case involving an unrepresented defendant who does not speak En-
glish. In the absence of rules directing a solution, should the judge
simply adjourn the case, try to secure counsel for the defendant, try to
get an interpreter, or negotiate a settlement between the parties? Each
choice would bring the case to a different equilibrium and each is
plausible. The judge will use a focal point, or Schelling point to
choose among these equally suitable paths.
Choices like these play out across the justice system every day.
In each courtroom and clerk's office, litigants, clerks, judges, and
others act in conformity with their understanding of what others think
is acceptable in the justice system. Very few of those actors want to be
unjust or want to foster practices that deny or limit access, although
they do face very real constraints and pressures. But too few have
ready access to reliable, valid data that would usefully predict which
solution is optimal in each case, nor do they learn often enough about
norms and accepted best practices in other jurisdictions, courts, and
offices. In short, many would benefit from more reliable, well-vetted
focal points to inform their daily work. While reform at this level can-
not ameliorate inadequate resources, or do much to address substan-
tive legal issues, it can make a real difference in access to justice on
the ground.
48. See id. at 90-97 (discussing traditions and culture as focal points and describing
the intellectual process of discerning focal points in coordination games as one of
imagination and empathy).
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IMPROVING SCHELLING POINTS FOR ACCESS TO JUSTICE
Judges, clerks, litigants, and others are constantly using unspo-
ken, shared assumptions about the justice system. Some reform strate-
gies make explicit, clarify, and sort among the competing focal points
that are constitutive of our shared understanding of access to justice in
America. A key example of this work is the Justice Index created by
the National Center on Access to Justice at Fordham Law School. 49
The Justice Index is an online resource that scores and ranks the fifty
states, District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico on their adoption of se-
lected best practices for ensuring access to justice.50 The Index is in-
tended to create incentives by publicizing comparative data.
The Justice Index is a notable example of the growth of indexes,
lists, and assessments of all kinds of systems, services, and markets.
Heather Gerken's book, THE DEMOCRACY INDEX, 5 1 is a well-devel-
oped application of the indexing idea to the American election system.
In her book, Professor Gerken collects and analyzes data to rank the
states' voting systems. Recognizing that indexing is not a panacea, the
book has a useful discussion of the limits, as well as the benefits of
indexing. This ranking of voting systems is a very sophisticated,
nuanced example of the larger contemporary phenomenon of lists and
rankings of all sorts of products, services, and institutions.
Highlighting the work of coordinating strategies need not dimin-
ish the importance of reform to substantive and procedural law of
budgetary support for access to justice by legislatures 52 and courts. 53
Given the scope and complexity of the justice system, there is ample
49. JUST. INDEX, http://justiceindex.org/ (last visited July 7, 2017).
50. Id.
51. Heather Gerken, THE DEMOCRACY INDEX: WHY OUR ELECTION SYSTEM IS
FAILING AND How To Fix IT (2009).
52. For information on Texas's efforts, see TEX. ACCESS TO JUST. COMM'N, http://
www.texasatj.org/state (last visited Apr. 18, 2017), which describes legislation raising
the cap on civil fines that may be directed to legal aid funding. See also Press Release,
Cal. Senator Bob Wieckowski, Wieckowski Applauds Increased Legal Aid Funding to
Provide Low-Income Californians Access to Courts (June 10, 2016), http://sdI0.sen
ate.ca.gov/news/2016-06-10-wieckowski-applauds-increased-legal-aid-funding-pro-
vide-low-income-californians (describing a California legislative effort to increase ac-
cess to justice).
53. For an example of significant change within a system of direct communication
and influence, see PERMANENT COMM'N ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE
CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (2016), http://www.nycourts.gov/accessto
justicecommission/PDF/2016_AccesstoJustice-Report.pdf. Florida offers another
example of court initiated action. See Administrative Order No. AOSC16-71 of the
Supreme Court of Florida (Oct. 10, 2016), http://www.flaccesstojustice.org/read-the-
administrative-order/.
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space for several different kinds of strategies for improvement. Where
leadership is committed, and makes access to justice a signal issue,
much can be accomplished. New York is a prime example of how
much can be accomplished by dynamic and skillful judicial leader-
ship. But, not every system is ripe for top-down change, and, even
when it is, coordinating these large systems remains a challenge.
Room for local reform remains. In those cases, where political or other
factors make leaders less oriented toward reform, coordination re-
mains a viable strategy.
The Justice Index is usefully understood as a coordinating mech-
anism, although that is not the only frame in which its virtues may be
explored. It measures access to justice in four dimensions-access to
counsel, assistance for unrepresented people, support for people with
limited English proficiency, and support for people with disabilities.54
The Index does not claim these four categories are exhaustive of ac-
cess to justice or even analytically necessary to access; the project is
much more pragmatic. It has identified consensus features of access
that are reasonably subject to assessment, both because the goals are
well specified and data on each feature is available or readily
gathered.
For example, in ranking jurisdictions on the degree of help they
offer pro se litigants, the Index measures whether the state has a court
employee dedicated to creating initiatives to help those litigants, court
staff are trained on working with pro se litigants, electronic filing sys-
tems are accessible to pro se litigants, and more than twenty other
factors.5 5 Its measures of language and disability access are similarly
practical and relatively modest in scope. The Index does not aim for
systemic, all-encompassing change; its primary audience is not com-
prised of Supreme Court judges and governors. Although high-level
leaders are often attentive to overall rankings that get public attention,
those who work at lower levels in a given hierarchy have incentives to
attend to the details and mechanics of the particular components and
subparts that inform overall scores. 5 6
54. Composite Index: Overall Scores and Rankings, JUST. INDEX, http://justiceindex
.org/2016-findings/findings/ (last visited July 7, 2017).
55. Self-Representation Access: Support for Self-Represented Litigants, JUST.
INDEX, http://justiceindex.org/2016-findings/self-represented-litigants/ (last visited
July 7, 2017).
56. University and hospital presidents, law and business school deans, and all kinds
of business CEOs must attend to the top-line U.S. News and other rankings. But their
many subordinates must know, follow, and directly respond to the nitty-gritty of rank-
ing systems. Rankings matter in business, education, the professions, and the public
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In addition to identifying key moments, creating metrics to mea-
sure them, and then ranking outcomes, the Justice Index also links
those outcomes to replicable policies and practices. In other words, a
judge, clerk, or other actor can learn what works and how to improve
access to justice in their daily work. The Index aims to be of practical
use when actors find themselves at Schelling points. Think of a mid-
level manager in the Clerk's Office of a court of general jurisdiction in
a mid-sized city. She is tasked with preparing an annual training
program.
We can usefully conceptualize the different combinations of sub-
jects that mid-level manager might choose to cover in the training as
multiple equilibria. In other words, there are many different reasona-
ble combinations of topics a knowledgeable trainer might include,
each of which is an adequate solution to the problem of what should
be covered in a training for clerks, judges, and other in the civil justice
system. The Justice Index helps to create a focal point that advances
access to justice by training court staff to view "helping people with-
out lawyers," 57 as a natural and intuitive part of their job. The Justice
Index also provides useful, vetted resources for conducting trainings
that will optimize outcomes.
Emerging problems and approaches, such as court-sponsored as-
sistance and unbundled legal services for self-represented people, pre-
sent particularly useful contexts for efforts to develop focal points.
After all, new problems and approaches are least likely to have settled
or widely-shared Schelling points. For example, the Index has several
metrics relating to limited scope or unbundled representation.5 8 While
unbundling of legal services is not a brand new idea, it is recent
enough that most judges, court personnel, and lawyers do not have
well-formed or fixed ideas about providing these kinds of legal ser-
vices. While change is often challenging to legal professionals, re-
spectful as they tend to be of precedent, new forms of practice offer
promising spaces for focal points.
sector, even as the mechanisms and magnitude of impact varies significantly with
context.
57. JUST. INDEX, supra note 55.
58. Id. Unbundled services, also known as limited-scope representation, are legal
services, including legal advice from a lawyer, aimed at a single problem and in the
context of a single encounter, rather than an ongoing attorney-client relationship. See
generally Forrest S. Mosten, Unbundling Legal Services Today, 35 FAMILY ADVO-
CATE 14 (2012) (describing unbundled services). For an insightful analysis of the need
for procedural reform to realize the promise of unbundling and other promising
changes, see Jessica Steinberg, Demand Side Reform in the Poor People's Court, 47
CONN. L. REv. 741, 774 (2015).
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For some lawyers, resistance to unbundled services reflects their
perception that the attorney-client relationship is naturally an ongoing
one. Of course there is nothing "natural" about the highly formalized
relationship between lawyer and client, but the power of a focal point
is, to small degree, its intuitive appeal. Focal points are what everyone
believes everyone else knows. As a lawyer, if I believe everyone else
thinks the attorney-client relationship must be ongoing and all-encom-
passing, I will be reluctant to tell other lawyers or judges, that the
relationship could or should be much more limited. I don't want to be
wrong. But, if I know others question that received wisdom, it would
change my behavior.
While a few questions in the Justice Index won't change profes-
sional attitudes by themselves, the Index and other efforts to make
unbundled services a part of the everyday conversation about improv-
ing access to justice are a worthwhile part of the effort to coordinate
the many dispersed actors in this complex system. The aim is to move
the attitudes and choices of multiple actors, each of whom has discre-
tion and autonomy. That autonomy both limits the degree to which
sweeping change can be imposed from above and opens a space for
change, even in the absence of leaders committed to reform.
For all its promise, indexing and ranking institutions is no pan-
acea. In many sectors, particularly education, the impact of rankings is
disputed and there is much criticism. But even in that sector, many
schools trumpet strong results, even though their faculties may decry
the underlying methods.5 9 In the marketplace, standard setting and
rankings are everyday tools; Schelling was an economist before he
was a game theorist. Credit and commerce rely upon an understanding
of shared standards in the absence of direct communication. But still,
not everything that can be counted, should be counted and not every-
thing that should be counted, can be counted.
The danger of managing to the index or ranking, rather than the
context, remains. A canny administrator can confer the title "Director
of Access to Justice" on an employee so that his or her unit can check
the box on a survey but give that person no resources or authority. It is
a problem that incentives can often be gamed, and that it is challeng-
59. The U.S. News rankings of universities have shifted some important focal
points for school leaders in ways that many see as detrimental. Emphasis on standard-
ized test scores of entering students as a measure of institutional strength has created
incentives to award financial aid in ways that many see as promoting privilege and
decreasing opportunity. See generally DIANE RAVITCH, THE LIFE AND DEATH OF THE
GREAT AMERICAN SCHOOL SYSTEM (2010) (discussing the negative impact of the rise
of assessment and benchmarking in primary and secondary education).
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ing to calibrate the incentives to each setting. These are issues that
must be addressed, but they are not a fundamental critique of data
driven indexes.
Another set of problems inherent in data-driven rankings is that
they must rely on things that can be measured. Sophisticated systems
can find many useful data points and proxies for intangibles that resist
counting and ordering. No index yet created, however, can measure a
court's progress toward perfect justice. The norm is too contested and,
in our current understanding, too much a matter of context and specif-
ics. But again, the risk that we will only attend to what we count must
inform our efforts, but it is not a reason to give up counting.
A third set of concerns revolves around the now general under-
standing that Schelling points, as shared (or believed to be shared)
social understandings, by their nature, encode bias and stereotypes.
Schelling points are powerful because they permit coordination in the
absence of direct communication. But they are second best to direct
communication. The message they convey is incomplete and relies
upon the judgment, discretion, and receptivity of each actor. The use
that each actor makes of a focal point is, in the end, informed by the
understanding of that actor. Focal points cannot make us good, but
they can help us to be good, if we are so inclined.
CONCLUSION
The justice system in America is vast, varied, complex, and dy-
namic. It is the sum of the work and activities of a multitude of actors
in many different courts, tribunals, and agencies. Opportunities for
top-down, systemic reform across the whole system are extremely
limited. And even where a court or official is vested with binding au-
thority over lower courts or government officials, barriers to effective
top-down reform remain. For example, information does not flow eas-
ily even where there are clear lines of authority and horizontal ex-
change of information among similarly situated courts in different
states, is very limited and almost entirely informal.
In a system with that structure-great complexity, multiple equi-
libria, and limited information flow-focal points are a key mecha-
nism by which actors coordinate their behavior. Judges, clerks,
litigants, and policy makers struggle with the challenges of increasing
numbers of unrepresented litigants, non-English speaking litigants,
physically-challenged litigants, and the constant struggle of resource
constraints. In that struggle, information about what works for others
and how good ideas can be replicated is of tremendous value.
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American courts were not designed for efficiency, uniformity, or
centralized control. Local control and individual discretion, is often
constrained, but not closely dictated by law. These are deeply embed-
ded features our system, dedicated as it is to checking power by divid-
ing it. There is much to be gained by coordinating the work of all
those local actors and efforts like the Justice Index are important, use-
ful, and potentially powerful ways to get all those people pulling in the
same direction.
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